The recovery and cleanup operation following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center was a project unlike any other in history. Rising to the challenge, and working around the clock for nine months, engineers and construction managers directed the removal of 1.6 million tons of material. Remarkably, this was accomplished ahead of schedule, below budget, and without any serious injury. The success of this operation makes it an excellent candidate for further study.
Introduction
Removal of debris from Ground Zero-the area immediately in and around the Twin Towers in New York City-became a national priority immediately following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Massive mobilizations of equipment and personnel were made, first to attempt to rescue any survivors and then to begin removal of material from the site to enable recovery of remains. It was soon obvious that new procedures and new organizations would be needed to conduct the operations (Langewiesche 2002; Myers 2003) . As stated by Langewiesche (2002) , " [t] he inapplicability of ordinary rules and procedures to such a chaotic environment required workers there to think for themselves, which they proved very capable of doing."
This study investigates decisions concerning the placement, use and management of debris removal equipment, particularly cranes, during the first one hundred days of the project. We explore the impact of risk on these decisions, and how decision making about this equipment influenced the project's effectiveness and efficiency. This analysis is supplemented with a case study that further illustrates how new procedures and management structures emerged during the operation.
Background
Emergencies-whether technological, natural or human-induced-challenge society's capabilities both for planning and response. While information technologies and advanced analytic techniques continue to expand how society can limit and manage emergencies (Rinaldi et al. 2001) , flexibility remains crucial to an organization's ability to respond to them (Mileti 1999; Stewart and Bostrom 2002) . Unplanned-for contingencies-events for which no planned-for procedure exists-create the need for the responding organization to develop and deploy new procedures in real-time. The response to the 2001 World Trade Center attack offers numerous examples of how flexibility may contribute to resilience following the onset of an unplanned-for contingency (Wallace et al. 2003) : subway maintenance workers joined the response effort to remove obstacles and lift and move heavy debris and wreckage (Kennedy 2001) ; police responded without the use of cellular phones and pagers (Rashbaum 2001) ; and electric utility crews improvised a solution to widespread power outages (Banerjee 2001) .
Studies based on field data offer opportunities for examining extreme event decision making in a rich environment characterized by complexity, uncertainty, risk and urgency (Mendonça forthcoming; Vidaillet 2001) . By investigating data associated with the cleanup of the Ground Zero, society may better understand the
Study Methodology
In this section, a method for examining decision making about the use of debris removal equipment at Ground Zero is presented. The objectives are two-fold: first, to describe on-site decision making in terms of changes in salient variables, identified through background research that includes interviews with project personnel; second, to document-in detail-one case of engineering innovation that arose out of the circumstances of the cleanup effort.
The study period is the first one hundred days following the attack. Based on consultations with participants in the cleanup and on examinations of secondary sources (Langewiesche 2002; Tamaro 2002) , a preliminary set of variables was identified that would be used in describing decision making about the placement and use of debris removal equipment. For various reasons, certain data sources either did not exist or were not available in a usable or appropriate form. This is partly a consequence of the evolving and highly uncertain nature of the project: many of the data generation and collection protocols evolved over time, leading to data sets that were useful for decision making during the project, but of limited usefulness for posthoc examinations of decision making.
Data Sources. The primary data sources consist of reports from field engineers, maps showing the locations of heavy equipment, engineering drawings, and measurements of displacement of slurry wall panels, each of which are now briefly described.
The company responsible for a sector filed daily a Field Report at the end of each shift. Initially, there was usually one report per sector, although as time progressed one team might cover multiple sectors. Each report used a standard header containing the date of the meeting, sector (usually denoted by the team name) and the names of the reporting engineers. The body of the report was usually contained a number of observations, given as bulleted items. The reports were hand-written. A sample observation was "Received and Reviewed proposed demolition plan for west façade of Tower 2."
The day-to-day locations of large debris removal equipment (i.e., cranes) were recorded by field engineers who walked the site and annotated site plans. The annotations were then entered into AutoCAD drawings and archived as Crane Maps, which allowed engineers to view the location and approximate maximum reach of each crane. As new equipment made its way onto or from the site, or as cranes were moved around the site, the maps were updated.
Engineering Drawings were used for various purposes. Some presented specifications and instructions for work (such as the placement of cranes), others were used to communicate site assessments (e.g., extent and nature of damage to structures). Drawings were made by hand and by using CADD software.
Variables and Analytic Framework. Measures of organizational performance include the amount of debris removed from the site, as well as avoided human and economic losses. The first of these is the main focus of the present study. One conclusion from consultations with personnel involved in the project is that the amount of debris removed from the site could have been influenced by a number of factors, including frequency of work stoppages (and their causes), the amount and capacity of debris removal equipment, risks associated with slurry wall and decision making procedures employed by management. Variables associated with each of these factors are described in this section, along with the sources from which the values of these variables were estimated.
The Field Reports were used to identify instances of decision making and planning about debris removal equipment. A independent member of the research team was provided with all meeting notes and instructions for classifying the content of individual meeting items, reported on as "decision" or "plan" statements. Decision statements are statements about allocations of resources that had already been made. A plan statement referred to "a scheme, program, or method worked out beforehand for the accomplishment of an objective" or to "a proposed or tentative project or course of action." This category includes judgements (e.g., "The company said they would remove the equipment by tomorrow."). A tally was also kept of reported work stoppages, along with the reasons for those stoppages, and of reports of inactive equipment.
Finally, the Crane Maps were used to determine which cranes were present on-site during the study period, and to identify any movements of these cranes. The study variables are summarized in Table 1 .
Data on the context of decision making are analyzed in an exploratory way through the use of summary statistics and graphs. An exploratory approach is appropriate since the data were not collected in controlled conditions, and an important contribution of the current work is to identify questions that may be pursued in future studies.
Data for the case study are presented in the form of a narrative that draws upon a variety of sources, including engineering drawings, Field Reports and an interview with two of the engineers involved in the case (one of whom is a co-author of this study). The analytic approach of the case study, which is adapted from prior. (Zigurs and Buckland 1998) , provides the means to classify and describe tasks according to their complexity (Campbell 1988 ) and enables a discussion of the technologies that are most appropriate for supporting the execution of similar tasks (Zigurs and Buckland 1998) .
Results

Context.
Visual presentation of the data from the study variables described above allows for a preliminary examination of distinctive patterns in the data. Figure 1 shows the values of a number of salient variables over time, as follows. Two key measures of performance were the number of loads and tonnage removed from the site per day, shown respectively as the first and second series in the figure. Both measures show considerable fluctuation over the study period, with no obvious trends or periodicity. The third series shows the number of reported movements of cranes, either onto the site, off the site or around the site. While data are not available for all days in the study period, it is possible to see that crane movements diminished over time, reflecting participants' reports that cranes became increasingly less effectual over the lifetime of the project, in part due to the increasing need to dispatch debris removal equipment to places that could not be reached by cranes and as access roads into the debris pile were constructed. The reduction in the contribution of cranes to debris removal is also reflected in the fourth series, which shows the number of cranes onsite. The data from early in the study period show large numbers of cranes, while by late October the number had diminished more than 75%. On-site cranes remained active, however, as shown in the fifth series. All cranes were utilized for many of the days during the study period, at a rate that only occasionally declined to below 25%.
The declines shown in the fifth series are sometimes reflected in the sixth series, which shows the number of stoppages per day. Reported stoppages were infrequent until mid-October, and then averaged approximately once every two days for the remainder of the study period. In informal interviews with participants, it seems that not all short-term stoppages were reported in the Field Reports.
A glaring change appears in late October, when reported load and tonnage totals decreased sharply. This change roughly coincided with an increased number of stoppages (series six). It may also be reflected in a drop in decision making (i.e., an increase in planning), as shown in the seventh series. The seventh series shows a gradual increase in the frequency of reported decisions relative to plans. The variable is computed as the number of statements reflecting decisions divided by the sum of this same number and the number of statements reflecting planned activities. In other words, the Field Reports are increasingly devoted to reporting of decisions rather than plans.
Some indication of on-site risk is provided by an examination of the measured displacements in the slurry wall. Sensors of various types were placed on the slurry wall slabs. Measurements were taken frequently earlier in the project, then with less regularity as the work progressed and it became clear that the slurry wall had stabilized. Displacement was measured along the north and south axes of the compass, as well as vertically. Because not all displacements were always collected, it is not possible to present a single value for displacement for each day. However, it is possible to consider the east-west, north-south and vertical displacements individually over the study period. Figures 2 shows the frequency of occurrence of various values of displacement (measured in feet) along east-west axis, with the first bar showing the frequency of occurrence of zero displacement (the charts for the other axes are similar). The data clearly suggest that displacements occurred somewhat frequently, with some being fairly large. Further analysis of the data should indicate the contribution of tiebacks to reductions in movement.
In summary, then, there are some suggested relationships among the various data series, and these help provide some of the context for decision making. Performance as measured in loads is reasonably constant over time, with little evidence of periodicity or other trend over time. There is some suggestion that, after 27 October, overall performance diminished. This may of course in part be due to the increased difficulty in removing debris from the site. Over the course of the project, smaller capacity, more agile pieces of equipment were increasingly used, and these changes in the configuration of on-site equipment may have caused the organizations to re-think how to utilize heavy equipment. The increase in reports of decision making over planning suggests that the organization became established in its procedures over time. Finally, some degree of risk of slurry wall collapse was often present, with more than 60% of the observed displacements having a non-zero value.
Case Study. The impact of risks associated with potential movements of the slurry wall may be investigated more deeply by considering how such risks influenced crucial design decisions, such as where and how to place important cranes. In October, one of the site contractors proposed placing a crane over the tunnel of the 1/9 subway line in order to remove nearby debris. The Cortlandt Street Station, which provided access to the 1/9 subway and was located directly under the World Trade Center complex, was one such station. The reopening of the line was considered a prime objective in the recovery of the New York City transportation system.
An engineering study was conducted to decide if damaged support beams in the 1/9 subway station tunnel could support the load of the crane. Personnel from New York City Department of Design and Construction, Thornton-Tomasetti Group Structural concerns constrained where the crane could be placed, as well as what would have to be done to place it. Most of the station structure under consideration to support the crane was found intact. The surrounding area was filled with debris; some columns in the tunnel were buckled; and steel beams from the towers had penetrated the roof of the tunnel, thus further weakening it. The placement of the crane needed to be close to the slurry wall in order to maximize the debris removal not only in the area of the towers, but also in the area of World Trade Center 6, north of Tower 1. Maintenance of the integrity of the slurry wall was a key concern, and its compromise could have had dire results (Tamaro 2002) . As stated by Langewiesche (2002) , "the waters would gush uncontrollably through the entrances to the twin Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) commuter-rail tube… This flood would likely have the effect of spreading through the New Jersey rail connections and back into New York around Greenwich Village, pouring into the West Side subways and causing unimaginable havoc with the functioning of the city."
The position of the crane could not be near the escalator bank that went from the mezzanine level to the station area. TTG was to design a mat to be placed under the crane to distribute its load to a value of 1000 psf. If reduction of the load by half of the initial estimate was not feasible, addition shoring to support the structure would be designed. NYCT indicated that leaving the crane in one position, providing shoring for support of 2500 psf for safety would be acceptable.
Concern about slurry wall movement is reflected in meeting notes from 29 October regarding the placement of the crane mat. Engineers noticed a slight movement (less than 2 inches) and took corrective action to prevent a collapse. The note related the change in the slurry wall to a possible imbalance against the subway wall. Additional bracing would be needed. A check list was developed to evaluate the shoring requirements for the 1/9 tunnel. Subsequent investigation of the subway on 1 November showed that the structure below the 1/9 at the PATH escalator was intact. Each beam was measured with a tape measure to provide a basis for the load calculations. An extra 1/8 inch was included to take paint layers into account. Initial load capacities were derived from standard sources. The engineering study was completed on 3 November.
The task then became to find a point along the tracks that suffered the least amount of damage and would provide a position that would enable the maximum amount of debris to be removed from the surrounding area. The depressed area east of the tunnel would cause poor visibility for the crane operator. Placing a spotter at a higher location to guide the operator put the spotter and other workers at a higher safety risk.
On 7 November, the engineering design for the shoring was completed. The positioning of 12-inch by 12-inch timber supports was offset by 1.5 feet to 2.5 feet from a damaged column. Steel blocks were added to the top of these timber supports. A timber mat to support the actual crane was placed on top of the support beams perpendicular to the subway tunnel. The crawler tracks for the crane to move into position were placed parallel to the subway tracks.
Once the point of greatest support was located, the next decision was gaining access to that point to place the crane. The damaged structure was collapsed and the area filled with dirt and other support material known as dunnage to create a roadway into the location. The collapsing of the damaged pieces of the tunnel was done before the crane began to move into the site. If the tunnel was not compressed, the weight of the crane could collapse the tunnel more with the added complexity of having the crane stuck in the debris. This minimized the time for removing debris before the placement of the crane and minimized the amount and cost of shoring the tunnel that was more or less left intact.
Examination of the subway tunnel showed column damage severe enough to collapse under either of the two candidate cranes, a Manitowoc 4100 or a Liebherr 1400. A plan was devised to maximize the coverage of the crane arm-thereby reducing the crane's dynamic force-while providing for operator safety. The dunnage for the crane was made from the tower's steel columns,, many of which were in good condition and readily available. . To minimize the amount of shoring needed, particularly in areas that were damaged and were the most dangerous to work in, the crane itself collapsed the unneeded parts of the tunnel to provide the access road for trucks. Debris was then loaded onto trucks for transport to a landfill.
The initial estimate to restore subway service along the 1/9 line was approximately three years. To speed restoration of service, the Cortlandt Street station was not reopened. The new stop for the World Trade Center area was the Rector Street station, several blocks south of the site. Service was eventually restored on 15 September 2002, two years ahead of schedule.
Discussion. The case study illustrates what was sometimes the evolving nature of onsite construction. There was repeated feedback from the field that informed the development and refinement of plans for the crane's placement and assembly. The highly uncertain nature of the task required the real-time development and deployment of new data collection procedures. Further investigation of the case from the task-technology fit perspective can be used to identify opportunities for supporting tasks similar to those discussed in the case. Campbell (1988) proposes four categories of tasks: problem solving tasks, which involve finding the best way to satisfy a single criterion; decision tasks, in which "choosing or discovering an outcome that optimally achieves multiple desired end states" is emphasized; judgement tasks, in which task-associated information is "conflicting and probabilistic in nature;" problem tasks, in which there is "a multiplicity of paths to a well-specified, desired outcome;" and fuzzy tasks, which include "both multiple desired end-states and multiple ways of attaining each of the desired outcomes." The types of technologies for supporting these tasks include those for process structuring, communication support and information processing (Zigurs and Buckland 1998) .
Four main tasks may be identified. The first task was to determine the location of the crane over the tunnel. The purpose was to decide whether or not the crane could be placed in the desired area, whether some other crane would have to be used, or whether it might be impossible to place a crane there at all. This task combined elements of judgement and decision. An solution outcome had to be discovered that would enable debris removal by the crane, would preserve the structural integrity of the station and could be executed in a timely and safe manner. Many of the considerations taken into account by engineers were situation-specific. The tools for making the decision included paper and writing instruments, hand calculators and simple measuring tools such as tape measures. Support was provided through technical manuals. Free-form sketching was integral to the early stages of the design. Indeed, the first sketch for this case was made on a piece of scrap paper.
The second task was to design the mat on which the crane would rest. Designing the mat required engineers to consider the location and estimated loadbearing capacities of the columns in the station, and the types of material (wood, steel) that would be best suited to the intended location. This task may be classified as problem solving, since the intended outcome was clear and there appear to have been various ways of achieving it. The third task was to decide how the crane components would be transported to the mat. A small number of alternatives were considered before the decision was made to collapse part of the tunnel and to construct a roadway. This task may be characterized as problem-solving. These tasks required numerous iterations of designs for the mat and for the transport procedure. The standard procedures for obtaining approval for work were difficult to follow, in part because much of the work was highly non-routine in nature, in part because the time required to obtain the approval was not available. The fourth and final task was to place the crane on the mat. The archival data are insufficient to enable this task to be classified.
For the first task, and even at a broader level, decisions about equipment use were highly spatial. It was important to know past and current states of various locations around the site, including where and what types of work had been done. Numerous heterogeneous sources were used in making these decisions, ranging from those discussed previously (particularly drawings), to less formal sources such as discussions amongst project personnel. Inevitably, management-level decisions had to be communicated to the field (usually to a supervisor), and these communications were sometimes supplemented with supporting materials. To be useful, technologies to support spatial decision making would need to be able to handle heterogeneous data sources and to deliver them to various mobile devices.
For tasks similar to the second and third tasks, process structuring tools would have to support the execution of processes that had recently been re-structured, often in response to conditions that could not have been planned-for. Information processing support might be directed towards enabling more rapid development of engineering drawings, and more support for conducting what-if analysis of the few scenarios considered. However, it should be emphasized that, during the response to extreme events, the amount of available skilled labor is likely to increase with event severity, perhaps reducing the need for information processing support.
More broadly, operations at Ground Zero were continuous for many months, thus requiring individuals and teams to share knowledge and insights across shifts. The assignment of roles facilitated knowledge transfer and effective communications.
A crane team was established in order to provide continuity between shifts, often over multiple days. This was partly due to the nature of the work, which required engineers who could adopt a "heavy construction" frame of mind and therefore ask the right questions (e.g., Where is the crane going to be assembled?). To support these activities, new technologies might better support organizations in maintaining records of important communications networks (also called social networks) among project personnel, perhaps through the use of automated logging of various communications (e.g., by cellular phone or mobile computer).
A fair amount of effort was spent on managing project-related documents. Tasks included cataloguing, retrieving and distributing maps, meeting notes, drawings, sketches and various memos. Sometimes up to twenty printed copies had to be delivered into the field. Document management services supported some tasks, but it may be desirable to build systems which can respond to queries that are made in terms of geographic space or in terms of social networks. As an example, it may be advantageous to know which individuals had worked in a particular area of the site at some prior point in time.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the project required considerable innovation, and that innovation was encouraged-though not all suggested innovations were followed. One of the engineers involved in the project stated, "We had come up with the plan for supporting the crane on the west slurry wall, using the readily available steel columns from the building core, which we used such that they did double duty as tiebacks for the top of the slurry wall. [One of the lead engineers] came into our office at the site and congratulated everyone on the fast and innovative solution. Many of the engineers didn't even know what he was talking about. But they found out. And that helped foster an innovative and practical mentality."
Conclusions
The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center created an immediate need for rapid cleanup of the site, leading engineers to explore opportunities for innovation and initiative-taking in the placement and use of debris removal equipment. Contextual factors such as work stoppages seem to have been handled in a way that did not result in diminishment of established capability for debris removal. However, the flow of debris from the site fluctuated considerably, and showed no sign of steady increases or decreases.
In the future, distributed information technologies (such as networked handheld computers) will likely be of use in presenting management and operations personnel with historical data and, potentially, forecasts on site conditions. A key consideration separating the design of such systems from the design of existing systems is that information requirements are not likely to be known with sufficient certainty a priori. In other words, information technologies to support decision making must be capable of being reconfigured during the project to meet the needs of the project. A further challenge is raised by the increased presence of sensors on-site, and the ensuing questions of whether and how to integrate sensor and communications data to support the project.
The project required numerous newly-designed procedures, often under tight time constraint. Further analysis of data associated with the project should lead to additional insights into how to technology can support decision making, and to further distribution of lessons learned for structural engineering.
